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A common justiﬁcation for HOPE-style merit-aid programs is to promote and
reward academic achievement, thereby inducing greater investments in human
capital. However, grade-based eligibility and retention rules encourage other be-
havioral responses. Using data extracted from the longitudinal records of all un-
dergraduates who enrolled at the University of Georgia (UGA) between 1989 and
1997, we estimate the eﬀects of HOPE on course enrollment, withdrawal and com-
pletion, and the diversion of course taking from the academic year to the summer,
treating non-residents as a control group.
First, we ﬁnd that HOPE decreased full-load enrollment and increased course
withdrawals among resident freshmen. The combination of these responses re-
sults in a 9.3% lower probability of full-load completion and almost a 1-credit
reduction in completed credits. The credit-hour decline means that resident fresh-
men completed roughly 3,100 fewer courses between 1993 and 1997 because of
HOPE. Second, the scholarship’s inﬂuence on course-taking behavior is concen-
trated on students whose predicted freshmen GPAs places them on or below the
scholarship-retention margin. Third, HOPE increased summer-school credits by
63% and 44% in the ﬁrst two summers following matriculation. To the extent
intertemporal substitution occurs between the ﬁrst and second years in college,
summer-school enrollment accounts for most of it.1 Introduction
Introduced in 1993 and funded by a state lottery, Georgia’s HOPE (“Helping Out-
standing Pupils Educationally”) Scholarship covers tuition, mandatory fees and a book
allowance for all eligible degree-seeking high-school graduates at any of Georgia’s public
postsecondary institutions. The award value has accounted for at least 40% of the to-
tal cost of attendance at the state’s top public universities, amounting to $4378 in the
2003-04 academic year. HOPE recipients attending in-state private institutions receive
a ﬁxed payment of $3000. To qualify for the scholarship, an entering freshman must
have graduated from a Georgia high school since 1993 with at least a “B” average and
be a Georgia resident. Eligibility is not restricted by family income.1 To retain the
scholarship a student must have a 3.0 cumulative grade-point average (GPA) at regular
credit-hour checkpoints. Through July 2004, more than $1.4 billion in scholarship funds
have been disbursed to more than 600,000 students.
Since 1993 ﬁfteen other states have followed Georgia, adopting their own HOPE-
style merit scholarships. These actions have typically been justiﬁed in three ways. One
is to increase college enrollment; another is to keep the best and brightest from going to
school out-of-state. Cornwell, Mustard and Sridhar (2004) ﬁnd that Georgia’s program
raised total freshmen enrollment in Georgia colleges by about 6% between 1993 and
1997, but “keeping the best and brightest in state” accounts for as little as a quarter
of the overall program eﬀect. Further, the enrollment increase attributable to HOPE is
less than 15% of scholarship recipients.
A third justiﬁcation is to promote and reward academic achievement. Henry et
al. (forthcoming) matched the academic records of 1,915 “borderline” HOPE-eligible
Georgia high-school graduates with a group of 1,817 non-qualiﬁers, who graduated from
high school in the same year with the same core-course GPA and matriculated at the
same type of postsecondary institution.2 They showed that students in the ﬁrst group
1There were income restrictions in the ﬁrst two years of the program. A household income cap was
set at $66,000 in 1993 and raised to $100,000 in 1994, but abolished in 1995.
2The students in their sample graduated high school in 1995 when HOPE eligibility was determined
1had higher college GPAs and probabilities of graduating in 4 years and completed more
college credits. However, their ﬁndings cannot be construed as policy eﬀects because
both groups are inﬂuenced by HOPE; that is, qualiﬁers can become non-qualiﬁers and
vice versa.
While the GPA requirements for HOPE eligibility and retention may promote aca-
demic achievement, they also encourage other behavioral responses like enrolling in
fewer classes per term, withdrawing from classes when performing unsatisfactorily, and
choosing less challenging courses.3 Thus far, no attention has been devoted to these un-
intended consequences. We address this gap in the literature by examining the eﬀects of
HOPE’s retention rules on academic choices in college. Using data from the longitudinal
records of all undergraduates who enrolled at the University of Georgia (UGA) between
1989 and 1997, we estimate the eﬀects of HOPE on course enrollment, withdrawal and
completion, and the diversion of course taking from the academic year to the summer.4
Our empirical strategy is to contrast the behavior of in-state and out-of-state students
before and after HOPE was implemented, using the non-residents, who cannot receive
the scholarship, as a control group. We ﬁnd that HOPE decreased full-load enrollments
and increased course withdrawals among resident freshmen. The combination of these
responses is an 9.3% lower probability of full-load completion and an almost 1-credit
reduction in annual course credits completed. The latter implies that between 1993 and
1997 resident freshmen completed over 3,100 fewer courses than they would have in the
absence of HOPE. In addition, the scholarship’s inﬂuence on course-taking behavior is
concentrated on students whose GPAs place them on or below the scholarship-retention
margin and increased as the income cap was lifted and more students received the award.
Finally, in-state students diverted an average of 2.5 more credits from the regular aca-
by overall high-school GPA. Later the GPA requirement was changed to count only core-course grades.
3The only other study that examines HOPE’s eﬀect on academic achievement is Dee and Jackson
(1999), which examined the incidence of scholarship loss in the 1996 entering class of Georgia Tech
freshmen. They reported that computing, engineering, and science majors were more likely to lose their
awards, but did not address potential behavioral responses to the HOPE rules.
4These decisions do not exhaust the possibilities for HOPE’s inﬂuence. For example, the scholarship
could aﬀect a student’s choice of major or elective courses. We are currently examining the evidence
for both of these responses in a separate paper.
2demic year to the ﬁrst two summer terms after their matriculation.
2 Data
Our data come from three sources. The Oﬃce of Student Financial Aid provided
each student’s HOPE status. From the Registrar’s Oﬃce, we obtained credit hours
enrolled, attempted and earned, cumulative GPA, matriculation and graduation terms
(if available), high-school GPA (HSGPA), and advanced placement (AP) credits. Finally,
the Undergraduate Admissions Oﬃce provided pre-college and personal characteristics
such as SAT scores, high school attended, residency, ethnicity, gender, and age.5
Over the sample period, about 38,200 enrollees appear in the dataset. However,
because we are concerned with how HOPE aﬀects academic choices from the outset of a
college career, we limit the sample to (the nearly 33,000) students who enrolled at UGA
as ﬁrst-time freshmen (FTF). Further, we restrict attention to those FTF we regard
as “typical”—students who matriculated at UGA in the fall term of the same year as
they graduated from high school. Thus we exclude individuals who entered UGA before
graduating from high school, during the summer term after they graduated from high
school, and after the fall term following their high-school graduation.6 There are over
31,000 typical FTF in the sample, accounting for nearly 95% of all FTF from 1989-97.
After dropping to 3,042 in 1991, the number of typical FTF rose steadily to 4,165 in
1997. In HOPE’s ﬁrst year, when a $66,000 income cap was in force, only 35.2% (949)
of Georgia FTF entered with the scholarship. In 1994, the income cap was increased to
$100,000 and this percentage increased to 75.5. After the income cap was removed in
1995, almost all resident, typical FTF started their careers at UGA as HOPE Scholars.
Table ?? reports the means and standard deviations of the variables used in our anal-
5The College Board recentered SAT scores for tests taken on or after 1 April 1995 to reestablish the
average SAT I verbal and math scores near the midpoint of the 200-to-800 scale. SAT scores from the
Admissions Oﬃce for students in 1989 through 1994 classes were on the original scale. We recentered
pre-April 1995 SAT scores using the College Board’s SAT I individual score conversion table.
6During our sample period there was very little variation and no discernible trend in the number of
early or late matriculators.
3ysis, separately for residents and non-residents, over the pre- and post-HOPE periods.
The resident–non-resident contrasts shown in the ﬁrst six rows preview our main results.
For example, about the same percentage of resident and non-resident freshmen (64.2%
vs. 63.5%) completed a full-course load between 1989 and 1992. However, after 1992 the
full-load completion rates of these two groups diverged sharply, with the percentage of
in-state students completing full loads dropping to 50.9% while out-of-state percentage
remained near 60%.
3 Retention Rules and Academic Achievement
To retain HOPE a student must maintain a 3.0 GPA, which is evaluated at three
checkpoints. If a student fails to meet meet the GPA standard, she loses the scholarship,
but can re-establish eligibility at the next checkpoint if she raises her GPA back to the 3.0
threshold. Those who do not qualify for HOPE in high school can become eligible at each
checkpont if their GPAs are at least 3.0. During our sample period, UGA operated on the
quarter system where 45 credit hours (15 hours per quarter) was considered a full load
for an academic year. The GPA checkpoints occurred at 45, 90, and 135 credit hours,
corresponding to end of one’s freshmen, sophomore, and junior years. In total HOPE
would pay for 190 credit hours, the level required to earn a typical undergraduate degree.
However, there was (and is) no time limit on a student’s potential HOPE endowment,
which can be spent in the summer under exactly the same terms as the regular academic
year.
As discussed at the outset, the goal of tying scholarship retention to grades is to
promote academic achievement. Insofar as academic achievement is measurable by im-
provements in students’ grades, changes in the GPA distribution after 1993 suggest this
goal is being met at some level. Panels (a) and (b) of Figure ?? plot the kernel density
estimates of cumulative GPA distributions of typical UGA freshmen in the year prior to
HOPE’s introduction (1992) and the ﬁrst “full coverage” year (1995, the year the income
4cap was removed), by residency.7 Prior to HOPE, the non-resident grade distribution
lies to the right of the resident distribution and exhibits less variance. By 1995 the
situation reversed, with the resident distribution exhibiting a conspicuous peak at 3.0,
implying that HOPE contributed to the relative GPA gains for resident freshmen.
Some of these gains may be explained by the selection of relatively better in-state
students in the admissions process. Consider panels (c)-(f) of Figure ??, which show the
kernel density estimates of the SAT math (SATM) and verbal (SATV) scores for 1992
and 1995, by residency. Before HOPE, non-residents typically entered UGA with higher
SAT scores. After HOPE, there is no noticeable relative change in the resident SATM
distribution, but SATV scores of in-state students exhibit some “catchup”. Thus, based
on SAT scores, the evidence for a substantial improvement in the relative quality of
resident freshmen is not very strong. However, selection could have occurred in other
quality measures such as HSGPAs and AP credits, and we investigate these possibilities
more formally below.
Independent of selection, HOPE’s retention rules encourage a variety of grade-enhancing
behavioral responses. Students may increase their eﬀort or substitute school work for
market work, consistent with the goals of program. However, the scholarship also creates
an incentive for adjusting course loads and diﬃculty to achieve the GPA objective. We
examine on three particular responses.
One response is to enroll in fewer courses at the beginning of the term. A one-
course reduction from a full load during the ﬁrst year guarantees an extra term of
funding by forestalling the HOPE checkpoint, no matter how low a student’s GPA is. A
lighter load may also translate into greater per-class eﬀort and an increased likelihood
of earning higher grades without raising overall eﬀort. Because HOPE beneﬁts have
no time limit, any propensity to take lighter loads is exacerbated. A second response
is to withdraw from classes when performing poorly. Withdrawn classes do not enter
the GPA calculation, so students who are near the HOPE margin and not doing well
7We used the KDE procedure of SAS Version 8, a Gaussian kernel, and the Sheather-Jones plug-in
method to compute the bandwidth.
5in a class have an added inducement to withdraw. The combined eﬀects of enrolling in
lighter loads and withdrawing more frequently will reduce completed credits.
A third response is to choose classes where the expected grade is higher, all else
equal. Such a choice could be made on the basis of course content or a professor’s
reputation for grading leniently. Alternatively, a student may defer course work to the
summer, when grade distributions are signiﬁcantly more generous. From 1989–92, the
mean summer-term GPA of UGA freshmen was 2.89, compared with a fall-semester
average of 2.57, and this 0.32-point diﬀerence widened after HOPE. Further, the fall-
summer GPA diﬀerential shows up in all three major core-curriculum areas—humanities,
mathematics and natural sciences, and social sciences. These higher summer grades are
surprising because the typical summer enrollee is a “lower quality” student. The mean
fall-summer SAT diﬀerential was 15 (1141 vs. 1126) points before HOPE and 16 points
(1185 vs. 1169) thereafter.
To the extent that students attend classes more regularly and complete their assign-
ments more assiduously, human capital investments will rise. Trading work hours for
study hours may also increase human capital, since typical college-student jobs require
few skills and involve little training. The human-capital consequences of these alterna-
tive behavioral responses is less clear. Taking fewer courses as a ﬁrst-year student could
aid in the transition to college and better facilitate learning throughout her college ca-
reer. Conversely, the option to take fewer and less challenging courses has always existed
and did not arise with the HOPE Scholarship. Moreover, at an institution like UGA,
where most students come from middle- and upper-income households (65% of fresh-
men were ineligible for HOPE in 1993, when there was an income cap of $66,000), the
scholarship does not likely ﬁgure in the decision to attend college, although it may aﬀect
the decision where to attend.8 Thus, a reasonable conjecture is that the labor-market
8Examining IPEDS data covering the same time period as our analysis, Cornwell, Mustard and
Sridhar (2004) ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant increase Georgia-resident freshmen recently graduated
from high-school attending 4-year schools—which is precisely the population represented by the UGA
freshmen in our sample. They also show that two-thirds of the total HOPE-induced enrollment increase
in Georgia’s 4-year colleges is explained by a reduction in the number of students leaving the state.
6returns to academic choices should trump the scholarship incentives.
However, the course-taking decisions of freshmen operating under the HOPE rules
suggest otherwise. Figure ?? shows that the rates of full-course-load enrollment for
resident and non-resident freshmen diverged sharply after 1992. Between 1993 and
1997, the fraction of resident freshmen enrolled in a full load fell from 82% to 69%, while
the percentage of non-resident full-load enrollees remained at 80% or above. Similarly,
residents and non-residents withdrew at about the same rate before 1993, but after
HOPE in-state students withdrew much more frequently (see Figure ??). The combined
eﬀect of these responses, plotted in Figure ??, was a precipitous decline in the resident
full-load completion rate from 68% to 44%, with the rate for non-residents ﬂuctuating
fairly narrowly around 60% during the entire period. Figure ?? reﬂects the same story
in summer-school enrollment, where residents increased their credit hours compared to
non-residents after 1992.
4 Estimation and Results
4.1 Empirical Model
We identify the scholarship’s eﬀect on course-load adjustments and summer-school
enrollment by contrasting the responses of residents before and after the HOPE “treat-
ment” with those of non-residents who, because they cannot qualify for HOPE, serve as
the control group.9 In a regression context, this means estimating empirical models of
9The population of non-residents could still be aﬀected by HOPE if states that traditionally supply
students to UGA followed Georgia in adopting merit scholarships, or if the program allowed UGA to
transfer institutional aid previously allocated to Georgia residents to out-of-state students. However,
neither happened during our sample period in an empirically meaningful way. First, Florida’s Bright
Futures is the only other HOPE-like scholarship introduced and it did not start until the last year of our
sample. Second, the only evidence for institutional aid transfers occurs in 1996 and 1997 when UGA
began awarding Charter Scholarships (which provided about $2000 in direct aid and an out-of-state
tuition waiver) to non-residents, but less than ﬁfty of these scholarships were awarded in these two
years to all (not just freshmen) out-of-state students.
7the form
yitj = βG A i · Ht + α1 GAi + α2 Ht + X

iγ + HSj δ +  itj, (1)
where yitj is a behavioral response measure for student i from high school j in academic
year t (t =8 9 ,90,...,97); Ht is a HOPE indicator that is set to 1 for students who
matriculated after 1992; GAi is a Georgia-resident dummy; Xi contains race, gender
and class-year control variables; HSj indicates a graduate of high school j; and  itj is
the error term. The program eﬀect is captured by β, the coeﬃcient of the interaction
between the HOPE and Georgia-resident dummies.
The high-school dummies control for unobserved pre-college peer inﬂuences that
may aﬀect course-taking decisions in college. For example, Gaviria and Raphael (2001)
present evidence of strong school-level peer eﬀects on tenth-graders’ propensity to drink,
use drugs, go to church, and drop out of high school. Each of these behaviors could have
ramiﬁcations for a whole range of postsecondary academic choices, including those we
investigate here.
The course-load and summer-school responses have both extensive and intensive
margin expressions (e.g., whether enrolled in a full-course load vs. credit hours enrolled),
and we estimate the HOPE eﬀect for each case. Both kinds of outcomes (discrete and
continuous) are estimated by OLS and heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are
reported. To check our empirical strategy, we also determine whether the timing of the
program eﬀects coincides with HOPE’s introduction by estimating (??) allowing β to
vary over time. We expect stronger behavioral responses as the raising of the income
cap increased the number of students eligible for the award and information about the
retention rules became more widely diﬀused.
4.2 Selection
The average quality of both in-state and out-of-state students rose substantially
after HOPE. Table ?? shows that the average resident SAT score, HSGPA, and AP
8credits increased by 45.9, 0.28, and 1.8, respectively. Similarly, the non-resident averages
jumped by 39.4, 0.22, and 2.0. We examine the relative gains in student quality by
determining HOPE’s eﬀect on the SAT scores, HSGPAs and AP credits of Georgia
freshmen, estimating regressions like (??) for each pre-college outcome. During our
sample period these measures of high-school achievement were the sole determinants of
admission for about 90 percent of applicants. Lee (2004) conﬁrms their importance in
predicting success in college. When SAT scores, HSGPAs, and AP credits are added
to a regression of ﬁrst-year college GPA on Georgia-resident, HOPE, race and gender
dummies, the eﬀects of race and gender are virtually eliminated. HSGPA is by far the
most important determinant of ﬁrst-year performance, with an estimated coeﬃcient of
0.722.
The pre-college outcome results are given in Panel A of Table ??. The SATV regres-
sion produces an estimated program eﬀect of 9.3w i t hat-ratio over 3. In contrast, the
HOPE eﬀect estimate for SATM scores is only 1.5 with a t-ratio well below 1. These
ﬁndings are consistent with the SAT distribution changes shown in Figure ??.T h ee s t i -
mated HOPE eﬀect for HSGPA is 0.065 with a t-ratio of about 4. However, it is unclear
how much importance to assign the relative increase of HSGPA for in-state students,
because just as the shifts in UGA grade distributions may be explained by behavioral
responses, the same is true at the high-school level. The eligibility rules create many
of the same incentives as the retention rules. Further, there is no scholarship eﬀect on
AP credits, which suggests that HOPE has not led Georgia high-schoolers to choose
more advanced programs of study. Therefore, it does not follow that the relative im-
provement in residents’ high-school grades represents an increase in the relative quality
of in-state students. In sum, the direct evidence for selection is essentially limited to
SATV scores.10
10As an additional check, we also allowed the HOPE eﬀect to vary by year for each pre-college
outcome. Consistent with the overall result for SATM scores and AP credits, none of year-speciﬁc
coeﬃcient estimates is statistically signiﬁcant. In the cases of SATV scores and HSGPA, the estimated
eﬀects for the ﬁrst three years of HOPE are positive, increasing, and statistically signiﬁcant, whereas the
post-1995 coeﬃcient estimates are smaller and not statistically diﬀerent from zero. Thus, the relative
gains of residents are concentrated in the ﬁrst three years of the program.
9Finally, when we include the high-school achievement variables in our course-taking
regressions, the program eﬀect estimates change very little, but always in the direction
of greater magnitude.11 This is consistent with our ﬁnding that students with higher
SATs and HSGPAs and more AP credits are less likely to withdraw from a course and
more likely to enroll in and complete a full load. Thus, relative improvements in in-state
student quality will cause our college outcome results to be biased against showing a
scholarship eﬀect.
4.3 Course Enrollment, Withdrawal, and Completion
Now we consider the evidence related to HOPE’s inﬂuence on course-load adjust-
ments. The main ﬁndings are presented in panels B and C of Table ??.
Extensive Margins. The results in panel B indicate that HOPE reduced the proba-
bility of full-course-load enrollment by 4.2 percentage points and increased the likelihood
of course withdrawal by the same amount. The combined impact of these behavioral re-
sponses is a 6-percentage point lower probability of completing a full-course load. Each
estimated program eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the .01 level. Evaluated at the pre-HOPE
means of each outcome, these estimates imply that the full-course-load enrollment rate
fell by 5.1%, the withdrawal rate rose by 16.1%, and the full-load completion rate de-
creased by 9.3% because of the scholarship.
When we allow the HOPE eﬀect to vary over time, the estimated pre-1993 eﬀects are
uniformly small and statistically insigniﬁcant for each outcome.12 In contrast, after 1994
when the income cap was lifted, the coeﬃcient estimates are larger in magnitude, have
the “correct” sign, and are much more precisely estimated. Further, in each case the
post-HOPE coeﬃcient estimates increase in magnitude over the period. After the income
cap is removed in 1995, the estimated HOPE eﬀects for course withdrawal more than
11For example, in panel B of Table 2 we report an estimated HOPE eﬀect of –.042 on the full-load
enrollment probability. Controlling for SAT scores, HSGPAs, and AP credits raises this estimate to
–.048. The diﬀerence between the two estimates in this case is typical of that we ﬁnd in the other
outcomes. See Cornwell, et al. (2003) for details.
12The results of the timing regressions are reported in Cornwell et al. (2003).
10doubled, while the full-load enrollment and completion estimates rose by about 80%.
By 1997, the scholarship had reduced the probability that a freshman would complete
a full load by over 16 percentage points (relative to 1993). Clearly, as the income cap
was eliminated and more students became eligible, HOPE’s inﬂuence on grew.
Intensive Margins. The estimates in panel C show that the scholarship reduced
completed credits hours by almost 1, with decreased enrollments and increased with-
drawals each counting for half of the drop, consistent with the scholarship eﬀects on
each extensive-margin outcome. Both the completed and withdrawn-credits coeﬃcient
estimates are signiﬁcant at the .01 level; the estimated coeﬃcient for enrolled credits is
less precise, but still signiﬁcant at the .10 level.13 A 1-credit per year HOPE-induced
decline in credit hours means that between 1993 and 1997 Georgia residents completed
over 15,710 fewer credit hours than non-residents, or about 3,142 fewer courses.
Allowing the HOPE eﬀect to vary over time produces generally the same pattern
as in the extensive margins. Again, all pre-HOPE coeﬃcient estimates are statistically
insigniﬁcant. At the end of the sample period, ﬁrst-year residents were completing, on
average, 1.8 fewer credit hours (compared with 1993 levels).
4.4 HOPE Eﬀects Throughout the GPA Distribution
HOPE’s inﬂuence on course-taking decisions should depend on a student’s place in
the GPA distribution. One who is far below the 3.0 threshold in her ﬁrst year has a
strong incentive to enroll in fewer courses, because she will otherwise lose HOPE at
the ﬁrst checkpoint. Delay will guarantee one extra term of funding. A student on the
retention margin faces a similar, though probably weaker, incentive, as the probability
of HOPE loss for her is lower. In contrast, an individual with a GPA well above 3.0,
who is unlikely to lose the scholarship, may take more credit hours, as HOPE lowers the
cost of enrolling in an additional course.
13Although its eligibility and retention rules are somewhat diﬀerent, Binder and Ganderton (2002),
in their study of New Mexico’s merit-based SUCCESS Scholarship, report that program also led college
students to reduce the number of registered and completed credit hours during their ﬁrst two semesters.
11To test these propositions, we examine the eﬀects of the scholarship at three intervals
of the grade distribution for ﬁrst-year students: < 2.7, ≥ 2.7a n d< 3.3, and ≥ 3.3.
Because a student’s realized GPA category is endogenous, we base our analysis on an
ordered probit model’s prediction of her category.14 Using the pre-HOPE data only (to
avoid any potential contamination by the program), we estimated the ordered probit
and predicted the GPA interval each student will fall into for both pre- and post-HOPE
samples.15 Then, we repeat the analyses represented in panels B and C of Table ??
separately for the students predicted to be in each GPA category. Of the 30,703 ﬁrst-
year students (whose records contain high-school achievement variables and the name of
high school attended), there are 18,653 students with predicted GPAs below 2.7, 7,092
between 2.7 and 3.3, and 4,958 of 3.3 and above.16 Table ?? presents the results of this
exercise.
Extensive Margins. The estimated HOPE eﬀects on full-load completion, which re-
ﬂect enrollment and withdrawal decisions, closely conform to our expectations. Students
with predicted GPAs below 2.7 are 12.0 percentage points less likely to complete a full
load; the largest of the eﬀects. Those between 2.7 and 3.3 are 8.4 percentage points
less likely to complete a full load. Students predicted to fall in the highest category
are 7.7 percentage points more likely, suggesting that the scholarship promotes the aca-
demic progress of individuals with the greatest prospects for success at the university.
The HOPE eﬀect estimate for the lowest GPA interval is very precise, and all three
estimates are signiﬁcant at better than the .10 level.
Georgia residents with the lowest predicted GPAs are 5.8 percentage points less likely
to enroll in a full load and 11.2 percentage points more likely to withdraw from a course
because of HOPE. Students predicted to fall in the interval around 3.0 adjust primarily
through course enrollment. They are 8.4 percentage points less likely to enroll in a full
14We are grateful to an associate editor for this suggestion.
15The GPA-interval regression includes controls for residency, gender, race, HSGPA, SATM and
SATV scores, AP credits, and high-school eﬀects. The estimation results are reported in Lee (2004).
16The bottom CGPA category is over-predicted by about 5000 students, while the middle and upper
categories are roughly equally under-predicted.
12load, but no more likely to withdraw. The estimates for students with predicted GPAs
above 3.3 indicate a higher probability of full-load enrollment and a lower probability of
withdrawal for residents, neither of which is precisely estimated.
Intensive Margins. The HOPE eﬀect estimates for credits completed, enrolled and
withdrawn follow the pattern of the corresponding extensive margin ﬁndings. In general,
HOPE’s inﬂuence weakens as predicted GPA rises and the most precisely estimated
program responses are concentrated in the < 2.7 category. Georgia residents with the
lowest predicted GPAs completed an average of 1.57 fewer credits, enrolling in .65 less
and withdrawing from .92 more, during the HOPE period. The results also suggest that
HOPE caused a .8-credit drop among students near the retention margin and a .7-credit
rise among those predicted to be well above the 3.0 threshold, but both estimates fail
to meet even the .20 level of signiﬁcance.
To summarize, analyzing HOPE’s impacts by predicted GPA conﬁrms the proposi-
tion that the course-load reduction responses are concentrated among the students most
aﬀected by the retention rules. The same story emerges when this exercise is repeated in
terms of HSGPA categories corresponding to eligibility status: < 3.0 (ineligible), ≥ 3.0
and < 3.5 (marginally eligible), and ≥ 3.5 (“safely” eligible). Students with HSGPAs
lower than 3.0 and between 3.0 and 3.5 are less likely to complete a full load and com-
plete fewer credit hours in their ﬁrst year because of HOPE, while the eﬀect for those
with HSGPAs greater than 3.5 is essentially nil.
4.5 Intertemporal Substitution or Delay?
Do the program responses for Georgia-resident freshmen reﬂect decisions to intertem-
porally adjust their course loads—completing fewer credits in their ﬁrst year and making
up for it in their later years? Or, do these decisions slow their academic progress, leaving
them behind their non-resident counterparts for the remainder of their undergraduate
careers? We address these questions by estimating HOPE’s eﬀect on the extensive and
intensive course-completion margins by school year.
13In our sample, there are 31,117 typical students in their ﬁrst year, 23,923 in their
second year, 18,981 in their third year, and 14,755 in their fourth year. Some students
drop out, but most of the attrition occurs because we can not follow 1995-97 entering
classes through their fourth, third and second years, respectively.17 We found no program
eﬀect on persisting at UGA beyond the ﬁrst year. The coeﬃcient estimates on the GA·H
interaction were uniformly small and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Panel A of Table ?? presents the estimated HOPE eﬀects on full-load completion
and completed credits. The ﬁrst-year results are reproduced from Table ??.N o n e o f
the HOPE eﬀect estimates, on either margin, are statistically signiﬁcant for students
who are beyond their ﬁrst year in school. These ﬁndings suggest that the retention rules
do not simply encourage intertemporal substitution, but on balance, slow the typical
resident’s progression through college.
However, the estimates presented in panel A may be problematic for two reasons.
First, the income cap weakens the experiment for the 1993 and 1994 classes, as residents
are placed in the treatment group who are ineligible for the scholarship and not subject
to its incentives. Second, the prospects for intertemporal substitution are somewhat
obscured because the analysis unevenly lumps together several pre- and post-HOPE
cohorts. As an alternative, panel B repeats the analysis, limiting the sample to only the
1990 and 1995 classes, the latter being the ﬁrst “full-HOPE-coverage” cohort and the
former being the most recent never to beneﬁt from the scholarship. Although we cannot
follow the 1995 class into its fourth year, two ﬁndings stand out from this experiment: (a)
the ﬁrst-year program eﬀects are larger, and (b) the HOPE-induced drop in completed
credits in the ﬁrst year is erased in the second year. While completed credits are about
1.5 hours lower in the ﬁrst year because of HOPE, they are 2 hours higher in the second
year. Both estimates are statistically signiﬁcant at the .05 level. In contrast to the
results presented in panel A, the comparisons between the 1990 and 1995 classes cast
17Of course we cannot follow the 1995-97 classes to graduation either, for the same reasons. While
this should be possible in principle for the 1993 and 1994 entering classes, only 36% of the 1993 class
and and 44% of 1994 class graduated in four years.
14doubt on the notion that the scholarship slows academic progress.
4.6 Summer-School Course Enrollment
Tying scholarship retention to grades also creates an incentive to enroll in classes
where the expected grade is higher. We explore this behavioral response by examining
the eﬀect of HOPE on deferring course taking to the summer. As we discussed in
section ??, summer-school grade distributions are more generous even though summer-
school students are lower quality than those enrolled in regular academic-year courses.
The program eﬀect estimates on enrollment and credits completed, for the summers
following a student’s ﬁrst, second and third years, are reported in panel C of Table ??.
On the extensive margin, there is some evidence that HOPE increased the probability
that in-state students take courses in their ﬁrst summer. The estimated HOPE eﬀect is
7.1 percentage points with a t-ratio of about 1.6. However, the estimates for the second
and third summers are much smaller and statistically insigniﬁcant.
The support for a program eﬀect on the intensive margin is somewhat stronger.
HOPE increased completed credits by 1.44 in the ﬁrst summer, and by another 1.04
credits in the second; both estimates are signiﬁcant at the .06 level. The estimated
HOPE eﬀect for the third summer is negative, but its standard error is three times as
large. Evaluated at the pre-HOPE mean, the results for the ﬁrst two summers imply
that summer-school credits completed by Georgia residents rose 63% and 46% because
of the scholarship.
Overall, the summer-school enrollment data indicate that HOPE induced students to
divert course taking to the summer to meet HOPE retention requirements. Furthermore,
the incentive to forestall the ﬁrst checkpoint by taking fewer courses in the ﬁrst year is
balanced by the incentive to take courses in the ﬁrst summer to improve their GPAs.
To the degree intertemporal substitution occurs between the ﬁrst and second academic
years, taking classes in the intervening summer accounts for most of it.18
18Because the academic year runs from the summer to the next spring term, credit hours completed
in the second year include credits completed in the summer immediately following the ﬁrst academic
155 Conclusion
Following the introduction of Georgia’s HOPE Scholarship in 1993, state-sponsored
merit scholarships have proliferated, justiﬁed in part as inducements for academic achieve-
ment. While their GPA requirements for eligibility and retention encourage students to
apply greater eﬀort toward their studies, they also encourage other behavioral responses
like adjusting course loads and diﬃculty. In this paper, we examine student responses
to the eligibility and retention rules associated with the HOPE Scholarship. Using data
on the undergraduates who enrolled at the University of Georgia between 1989 and
1997, we estimated the eﬀects of HOPE on enrollment, withdrawal and completion, and
the shifting of course credits to the summer, treating out-of-state students as a control
group.
We ﬁnd that HOPE reduced the probability of full-course load enrollment and en-
rolled credit hours, and increased the probability of course withdrawal and withdrawn
credits for Georgia-resident freshmen. Together these responses amount to a 9.3% reduc-
tion in the likelihood of completing a full load and almost a 1-credit drop in completed
credits. The credit-hour decline means that resident freshmen completed over 3,100
fewer courses between 1993 and 1997 than they would have in the absence of HOPE.
Further, these course-load adjustments are concentrated among students whose pre-
dicted freshman GPA places them on or below the scholarship retention margin, and
their timing and magnitude are consistent with the introduction of the scholarship and
increase in the number of HOPE Scholars as the income restrictions were removed. How-
ever, the evidence is mixed on whether these course-load adjustments constitute a delay
in academic progress or intertemporal substitution.
The diversion of course-taking to the summer is an example of adjusting course diﬃ-
culty, as the average GPA of UGA freshmen is 10-15% higher in the summer than in the
fall, even though the typical summer-school enrollee has a lower SAT score and HSGPA.
We show that HOPE increased summer-school credits completed by Georgia residents
year, which is the ﬁrst summer after matriculation for typical students.
16by 63% and 44% in the ﬁrst two summers following matriculation. The summer-school
results suggest that, to the extent intertemporal substitution occurs between the ﬁrst
and second years, summer enrollment accounts for most it.
We conclude that HOPE’s grade-based retention requirements lead to behavioral
responses that partially undermine its objective to promote academic achievement by
encouraging greater eﬀort. While responses like taking fewer courses per term may
enhance human capital investment, the option to slow one’s progress toward degree
completion existed prior to HOPE. Finally, given the over-riding importance of the labor
market and that HOPE is infra-marginal to most UGA students’ decisions whether to
attend college, it is surprising that the scholarship has any inﬂuence on behavior. One
explanation of the scholarship’s inﬂuence is that these student responses emerge from
intra-household bargaining over HOPE rents in the decision where to attend college.
It is not uncommon for UGA undergraduates to admit to being “bribed” to forgo an
out-of-state or private-school alternative with an oﬀer of a car. This anecdotal evidence
is supported by Cornwell and Mustard (2004), who ﬁnd that car registrations in high-
income counties rise almost 1% for each 10% increase in the number HOPE recipients
attending a public college or university.
To what extent can these results be generalized to other state-sponsored merit schol-
arships? The answer depends on how HOPE-like they are. At least two characteristics of
Georgia’s program are key in this regard. First, the award is earned and retained solely
through meeting speciﬁed (mostly grade-based) academic criteria. Second, there is no
ﬁxed time period (e.g., eight semesters) for scholarship qualiﬁers to use their awards.
Many of programs started in the mid-1990s have these characteristics, although the
newest of the scholarships have limits on the number of semesters or academic years
they can be used. Finally, because UGA is a ﬂagship institution and virtually every
ﬁrst-year student qualiﬁes for the award, the magnitude of the eﬀects may diﬀer from
lower-tier institutions where smaller fractions of students qualify.
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18Figure 1
Kernel Density Plots of Cumulative GPA (CGPA) and SAT Math and Verbal Scores,
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Sample Means for Typical First-Year Studentsa
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses)
Pre-HOPE (1989-92) Post-HOPE (1993-97)
Variable Non-resident Resident Non-resident Resident
Full-Load Enrollment Rateb 81.2 82.2 81.2 77.0
Withdrawal Ratec 25.7 26.1 33.7 39.4
Full-Load Completion Rated 63.5 64.2 58.8 50.9
Credit Hours Enrolled 43.65 44.22 44.10 44.25
(7.13) (6.22) (6.95) (5.86)
Credit Hours Withdrawn 1.61 1.57 2.10 2.53
(3.29) (3.18) (3.66) (3.92)
Credit Hours Completede 42.04 42.65 42.00 41.71
(8.00) (7.22) (7.84) (7.33)
High-School GPA 2.99 3.12 3.21 3.40
(0.45) (0.51) (0.43) (0.42)
S A TM a t hS c o r e 564.51 559.78 585.17 582.40
(64.06) (67.93) (65.80) (69.38)
SAT Verbal Score 574.01 565.92 592.70 589.22
(73.63) (77.26) (73.21) (71.74)
SAT Total Score 1138.52 1125.70 1177.88 1171.62
(113.63) (124.78) (117.89) (120.98)
AP Credit Hours Earned 3.27 2.77 5.24 4.55
(6.10) (6.01) (8.38) (8.15)
a “Typical students” refers to those who matriculate at UGA in the fall term of the same year as
they graduate from high school.
b Percentage of typical ﬁrst-year students enrolling in a full-course load.
c Percentage of typical ﬁrst-year students withdrawing from a class.
d Percentage of typical ﬁrst-year students completing a full-course load.
e Credit hours completed = credit hours enrolled − credit hours withdrawn.
21Table 2
Estimated HOPE Eﬀect on
Pre-College and First-Year Course-Taking Outcomes
Typical First-Year Students, 1989-97 a
Coeﬃcient (s.e.)
Outcomes on GA · H f R2 N
A. Pre-College Outcomes
SAT Math Score 1.502 (2.307) 0.256 30,784
SAT Verbal Score 9.305 (2.700) 0.193 30,784
High-School GPA 0.065 (0.016) 0.289 31,021
AP Credits -0.013 (0.281) 0.148 31,116
B. First-Year Course-Taking Outcomes: Extensive Margin
Full-Load Enrollmentb -0.042 (0.016) 0.094 31,115
Course Withdrawalc 0.042 (0.018) 0.099 31,115
Full-Load Completiond -0.060 (0.019) 0.108 31,115
C. First-Year Course-Taking Outcomes: Intensive Margin
Credits Enrolled -0.474 (0.267) 0.110 31,115
Credits Withdrawn 0.441 (0.140) 0.103 31,115
Credits Completede -0.915 (0.306) 0.109 31,115
a Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors reported.
b Probability that a student enrolls in a full load in the ﬁrst year;
yit = 1 if credits enrolled ≥ 45.
c Probability that a student withdraws from a course in the ﬁrst year;
yit = 1 if credits withdrawn > 0.
d Probability that a student completes a full load in the ﬁrst year;
yit = 1 if credits completed ≥ 45.
e Credits completed = credits enrolled − credits withdrawn.
f Each outcome regression includes control variables for race, gender, class year, and high
school attended.
22Table 3
Estimated HOPE Eﬀect on
Course Enrollment, Withdrawal and Completion
by Predicted GPA Category
Typical First-Year Students, 1989-97 a
Predicted Coeﬃcient (s.e.)
Outcomes GPAb on GA · H g R2 N
A. Extensive Margin
Full-Load Enrollmentc < 2.7 -0.058 (0.022) 0.114 18,653
2.7-3.3 -0.084 (0.038) 0.154 7,092
≥ 3.3 0.040 (0.033) 0.156 4,958
Course Withdrawald < 2.7 0.112 (0.026) 0.125 18,653
2.7-3.3 0.021 (0.044) 0.151 7,092
≥ 3.3 -0.051 (0.041) 0.146 4,958
Full-Load Completione < 2.7 -0.120 (0.027) 0.130 18,653
2.7-3.3 -0.084 (0.047) 0.172 7,092
≥ 3.3 0.077 (0.044) 0.161 4,958
B. Intensive Margin
Credit Hours Enrolled < 2.7 -0.654 (0.361) 0.132 18,653
2.7-3.3 -0.643 (0.686) 0.150 7,092
≥ 3.3 0.497 (0.655) 0.180 4,958
Credit Hours Withdrawn < 2.7 0.920 (0.203) 0.134 18,653
2.7-3.3 0.144 (0.315) 0.143 7,092
≥ 3.3 -0.202 (0.261) 0.145 4,958
Credit Hours Completedf < 2.7 -1.573 (0.419) 0.135 18,653
2.7-3.3 -0.787 (0.764) 0.156 7,092
≥ 3.3 0.700 (0.704) 0.171 4,958
a Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors in reported.
b GPA category predictions were obtained from an ordered probit model estimated with the
pre-HOPE data. See Lee (2004) for details.
c Probability that a student enrolls in a full load in the ﬁrst year;
yit = 1 if credits enrolled ≥ 45.
d Probability that a student withdraws from a course in the ﬁrst year;
yit = 1 if credits withdrawn > 0.
e Probability that a student completes a full load in the ﬁrst year;
yit = 1 if credits completed ≥ 45.
f Credit hours completed = credit hours enrolled − credit hours withdrawn.
g Each outcome regression includes control variables for race, gender, class year, and high
school attended. 23Table 4
Estimated HOPE Eﬀect on
Intertemporal Substitution and Summer-School Course Takinga
Year/Summer Coeﬃcient (s.e.)
Outcomes in School on GA · H f R2 N
A. Intertemporal Substitution (1989-97 Classes)
Full-Load Completionb 1st Year -0.060 (0.019) 0.108 31,115
2nd Year 0.017 (0.023) 0.103 23,922
3rd Year -0.010 (0.025) 0.109 18,981
4th Year -0.020 (0.031) 0.108 14,755
Credit Hours Completedc 1st Year -0.915 (0.306) 0.109 31,115
2nd Year 0.479 (0.455) 0.120 23,922
3rd Year 0.524 (0.561) 0.122 18,981
4th Year 0.385 (0.717) 0.115 14,755
B. Intertemporal Substitution (1990 and 95 Classes)
Full-Load Completion 1st Year -0.065 (0.046) 0.168 7,081
2nd Year 0.053 (0.055) 0.162 6,304
3rd Year -0.013 (0.056) 0.165 5,770
Credit Hours Completed 1st Year -1.520 (0.666) 0.198 7,081
2nd Year 2.054 (1.038) 0.181 6,304
3rd Year 0.931 (1.282) 0.191 5,770
C. Summer-School Course Taking (1990 and 95 Classes)
Summer Course Enrollmentd 1st Summer 0.071 (0.045) 0.175 6,304
2nd Summer 0.037 (0.055) 0.172 5,770
3rd Summer 0.020 (0.059) 0.165 5,602
Summer Credits Completede 1st Summer 1.440 (0.443) 0.178 6,304
2nd Summer 1.042 (0.559) 0.171 5,770
3rd Summer -0.169 (0.643) 0.176 5,602
a Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors reported.
b yit = 1 if credits taken in the t-th school year ≥ 45.
c Credit hours taken = credit hours enrolled - credit hours withdrawn.
d yit = 1 if credits taken in the summer of the t-th school year > 0.
e Summer credits taken = summer credits enrolled - summer credits withdrawn.
f Each outcome regression includes control variables for race, gender, class year, and high school
attended.
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